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Abstract 
 The research herein explores the correlation between performance and shareholder 
concentration. This paper compares the performance of a group of companies with a single 
shareholder stake of over 10% from the universe of the S&P 400 Midcap Index to the 
performance of the index itself over a period of eight years (January 1, 2009 to January 1, 2016). 
When run as a simulated portfolio, the group selected generated a slight amount of positive 
alpha, but the results were ultimately statistically insignificant.  
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Introduction 
 Around the Northwest Arkansas area, one need not look far to stumble across a number 
of highly successful businesses. In a hundred mile radius of the University of Arkansas, one 
finds the headquarters of J.B. Hunt, Tyson, and Walmart. Three vastly different companies 
spanning a variety of industries. From retail to transportation, these highly varied businesses all 
have one peculiar trait in common: they are “family-owned” enterprises. All three of the 
founding families (although not necessarily the founders themselves at this point) still maintain 
significant ownership stakes in the firms. The abnormality of the shareholder concentration and 
the performance of such firms provided an impetus for this research. 
 It is precisely that phenomenon which this paper aims to explore. The question addressed 
herein is whether or not shareholder concentration correlates to stock price outperformance in 
midcap companies. Specifically, this analysis utilizes the S&P 400 Midcap Index as its universe 
of securities to benchmark the performance of 36 companies meeting the proper shareholder 
parameters from January 1, 2009 through January 1, 2016.  
 
Methodology & Analysis 
Timeframe: 
 The logic behind the window of time explored herein is as follows: the 2009-2016 
timeframe was chosen in an attempt to avoid most of the highly negative effects of the financial 
crisis on general share prices. With the uncharacteristic nature of a so-called “Black Swan” event 
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skewing traditional fundamentals, it made the post-crisis era a more constructive period for 
examination.  
Selection Criteria 
 Within the chosen universe (the S&P 400 Midcap Index), the companies of which the 
alternative examined portfolio was comprised were selected according to a number of criteria. 
First, of the 403 companies comprising the index, 336 were eliminated for not meeting a floor 
requirement of a single portfolio’s holding at least 10% of the outstanding equity. It is important 
to note that “single portfolio” was a parameter so as to eliminate the holdings of many passive 
money managing entities such as Fidelity, Vanguard, etc. that may have collectively exceeded 
the floor in their holdings (which would typically be a collection of a plethora of index-tracking, 
individual portfolios with small single positions). Second, of the 67 remaining companies with a 
current single shareholder exceeding 10%, 29 were eliminated due to the shareholders’ not 
having exceeded the floor for the course of the timeframe of interest. This step allowed for the 
elimination of such shareholders who had built up a 10% stake over the course of the window or 
whose holdings had fluctuated below said limit. This left the 36 companies seen below (figure 
1). 
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Original Group
% Stake Shareholder Ticker Name Sector Industry Group
49.14 RFPS Management Co. ROL  Rollins Inc Consumer, Non-cyclical Commercial Services
38.28 Liberty Media Corp. HSNI  HSN Inc Consumer, Cyclical Retail
35.01 Gazit Entities EQY  Equity One Inc Financial REITS
34.04 Joseph George MCY  Mercury General Corp Financial Insurance
29.36 Clarence L. Werner WERN  Werner Enterprises Inc Industrial Transportation
28.50 Ellen R. Gordon TR  Tootsie Roll Industries Inc Consumer, Non-cyclical Food
27.71 John N. Kapoor AKRX  Akorn Inc Consumer, Non-cyclical Pharmaceuticals
25.72 Hagedorn Partnership SMG  Scotts Miracle-Gro Co/The Consumer, Cyclical Housewares
21.61 Dareth A. Gerlach LANC  Lancaster Colony Corp Consumer, Non-cyclical Food
20.40 William Robert Berkley WRB  WR Berkley Corp Financial Insurance
19.88 JMAC Inc. WOR  Worthington Industries Inc Basic Materials Iron/Steel
19.81 Dai Ichi Life Insurance Co. Ltd. JNS  Janus Capital Group Inc Financial Diversified Finan Services
19.79 Biglari Capital LLC CBRL  Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc Consumer, Cyclical Retail
18.41 R. Philip Silver SLGN  Silgan Holdings Inc Industrial Packaging & Containers
17.88 Mubadala Development Co. AMD Advanced Micro Devices Inc Technology Semiconductors
16.60 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance HNI  HNI Corp Consumer, Cyclical Office Furnishings
16.52 James W. Cabela CAB  Cabela's Inc Consumer, Cyclical Retail
16.30 Singleton Group LLC KMPR  Kemper Corp Financial Insurance
15.61 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance GMT  GATX Corp Industrial Trucking & Leasing
15.18 Trian Fund Management LP WEN Wendy's Co/The Consumer, Cyclical Retail
15.14 Hyatt J. Brown BRO  Brown & Brown Inc Financial Insurance
15.05 Southeastern Asset Management Inc. GHC  Graham Holdings Co Consumer, Non-cyclical Commercial Services
14.49 Valentin Gapontsev Trust IPGP  IPG Photonics Corp Technology Semiconductors
14.02 Paul Marciano GES  Guess? Inc Consumer, Cyclical Retail
13.98 Silver Star Development Ltd. SNX  SYNNEX Corp Technology Software
13.35 Crane Fund CR  Crane Co Industrial Miscellaneous Manufacturing
13.33 Cventures Inc. MDC  MDC Holdings Inc Consumer, Cyclical Home Builders
12.40 Carlos Slim Helu NYT  New York Times Co/The Communications Media
11.33 Alice N. Schwartz BIO  Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc Consumer, Non-cyclical Biotechnology
11.12 Longdon Co. of Virginia NEU  NewMarket Corp Basic Materials Chemicals
11.00 Primecap Management Co. PLT  Plantronics Inc Communications Telecommunications
10.90 Carl H Lindner III AFG  American Financial Group Inc/OH Financial Insurance
10.73 John T. Ryan III MSA  MSA Safety Inc Industrial Environmental Control
10.42 Thomas A. James RJF  Raymond James Financial Inc Financial Diversified Finan Services
10.24 State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance ATR  AptarGroup Inc Industrial Miscellaneous Manufacturing
10.04 Atlanta Capital Management Co. FICO  Fair Isaac Corp Technology Software
Position size as of April 24, 2016 Figure 1
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Analysis: 
 Subsequently, the appropriate pricing data was pulled from Bloomberg for the various 
companies and index (quoted as weekly closing price). From this, an equal-weighted portfolio of 
the above equities was constructed by taking the week-to-week price performance (% change) of 
each company, then aggregating these changes into a portfolio comprised of the above selected 
firms. The same approach was taken for the index. This method was chosen so as to allow a 
proper comparison of the two entities (as opposed to an average of price movements which 
would possess similar inherent flaws to price-weighted indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index). Granted, constructing an equal-weighted portfolio of the various companies does 
inherently ignore a number of factors such as firm size. Such short-comings will be addressed in 
the Confounding Variables & Biases segment of the paper.  
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Figure 2 
Following, two portfolios, imagined to have started at a base of $100, were run through 
the various price change collections to produce the results seen below. 
 
A t-test and regression were then run on the data. The inputs and results are shown below. 
 
Figure 2 
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S&P 400 Midcap Index Concentrated Portfolio
t-test
S&P 400 Portfolio
Average Weekly Return 0.292% 0.372%
Weekly Std Deviation 2.71% 2.89%
Sharpe Ratio 0.090 0.112
Risk Free 0.0488%
T-Stat v. S&P 400 0.525
n 365
Beta 1.030981
Alpha 0.000719
Figure 3
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Note: 
 The Risk Free rate utilized was the average weekly yield of a U.S. Government 10-Year 
Note over the period 
 N is the number of observations for the week-end pricing data within the period 
examined 
 
 Results: 
 This analysis brings to the fore a number of considerations. Examining Figure 2 provides 
the reader with the initial impressions that firms with such concentrated shareholder bases tend to 
Regression 
Regression Statistics Alternate Calculation (Double Check)
Multiple R 0.96868 Beta 1.03098
R Square 0.93835 Alpha 0.00072
Adjusted R Square 0.93818 Avg Week Portfolio 0.00372
Standard Error 0.00718 Week Rf Rate 0.00049
Observations 365 Avg Week Mrkt 0.00292
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.28483 0.28483 5525.06110 1.0198E-221
Residual 363 0.01871 0.00005
Total 364 0.30354
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept (Alpha) 0.00072 0.00038 1.90458 0.05762
Beta 1.03098 0.01387 74.33075 0.00000
Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept (Alpha) -0.00002 0.00146 -0.00002 0.00146
Beta 1.00370 1.05826 1.00370 1.05826
Figure 4
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outperform the overall index within the given timeframe. From this though, one must then 
consider the level of risk required to achieve the superior performance.  
It is for this consideration that the t-test and Sharpe Ratios are most relevant. In 
comparing the Sharpe Ratio of the S&P 400 Midcap Index (.090) to that of the alternate portfolio 
(.112) that one is able to see that it does, in fact, outperform the given index on a risk-adjusted 
basis. Unfortunately, one must then consider the results of the t-test. With a value of .525, the 
results of the test are insignifant to make any conclusive claim. The answer that most readily 
comes to mind for these findings seems to be that, although one may gain a superior risk-
adjusted performance (utilizing only Sharpe Ratio as one’s metric), the amount gained by way of 
performance (.08% weekly) is very little more in terms of that which is shouldered by way of 
increased exposure to variance (.18%).  
 Moving to the regression analysis of Figure 4, one is able to gain a more clear 
understanding of the previously mentioned results. With an R Square value of .93835, it can be 
inferred that around 93% of the variance in the concentrated portfolio’s returns can be explained 
by changes in the overall market (which, in the case of this study is the S&P 400 Midcap Index). 
Conversely, what is implied by the calculated alpha and beta values is that the outperformance 
generated by said portfolio is extremely small (Alpha = .00072) and that the collection of 
companies with concentrated shareholder bases ultimately moves very similarly to the index 
itself (Beta = 1.03098).  
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Confounding Variables & Biases: 
 It should be noted that there are a number of external factors that could drive the results 
found herein. As was mentioned earlier, the study’s portfolio operates under the structure of an 
equal-weighted portfolio. This was the most effective way to perform the analysis of the piece, 
but is a short-coming in as far as accounting for firm size is concerned. 
 Furthermore, one must also consider the varying degrees to which the positions are 
concentrated as well as the variety of motives behind said positions. A prime example of such 
differences can be found in examining the positions of Thomas A. James and Trian Fund 
Management LP. In the case of Thomas A. James’s position in Raymond James Financial Inc., 
that is more similar to the various companies discussed in the introduction (“family-owned” 
enterprises). This can be compared to the motives behind Trian Fund Management’s positions in 
The Wendy’s Company. Trian, although having a similarly vested interest in their company’s 
performance as James, is a noted activist investor. This is important in that the strategies 
undertaken by an activist investor to drive value within a firm are often very different from those 
that dictate the thought-process of legacy and family shareholders (often long- v. short-term 
approaches).  It is challenging to draw such a simple connection as suggesting that a larger, 
single vested interest in a company’s performance will correlate to overall performance with so 
many variables at play, but the purpose of this study in itself was simply to examine the 
relationship between the two, not to expansively answer such other questions as what drives the 
relationship itself (should it have existed more strongly). 
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 One must also note that this research failed to perform out of sample testing. The 
portfolio tracked is constructed utilizing information beyond the scope of that which was 
available to shareholders at its time of incipience, and was not rebalanced over the course of the 
study. Hence, the results obtained herein would require more refinement and testing to construct 
an effective trading strategy.  
Finally, the benchmark used for the study was the stated price performance of the S&P 
400 Midcap Index at face value. This could be problematic in that the actual composition of the 
index over time is subject to change (a factor for which this study did not take account). Hence, 
this introduces aspects of survivorship bias to the analysis in that companies moving in and out 
of the index pool were largely ignored.  
 
Conclusion 
 Although the constructed index provides promising levels of performance, the statistical 
insignificance suggests that far more research is necessary. Possible alternatives in approach 
could take into account the size of the various shareholder positions as a percentage of overall 
outstanding equity or perhaps the size of the firms themselves. Interestingly, many of the 
companies meeting the shareholder criteria came from the consumer sector of the index. In line 
with the discussion of Walmart in the introduction, one could also possibility of this 
relationship’s existing in such sectors as Consumer Staples or Consumer Discretionary. 
 14 
 
 Ultimately, the findings of the study are statistically insignificant for the time period 
examined. Although this was the case, the relationship seen through the slight generation of 
alpha still provides a promising point of interest for further exploration.  
 
 
                                                                                           
 
 
 
